Civil Procedure: Right to Jury Trial: Congress Intended to Grant Right to Jury Trial in Actions Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. (Lorillard v. Pons). by Plaetzer, Ross F.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 62
Issue 2 Winter 1978 Article 6
Civil Procedure: Right to Jury Trial: Congress
Intended to Grant Right to Jury Trial in Actions
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
(Lorillard v. Pons).
Ross F. Plaetzer
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Ross F. Plaetzer, Civil Procedure: Right to Jury Trial: Congress Intended to Grant Right to Jury Trial in Actions Under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act. (Lorillard v. Pons)., 62 Marq. L. Rev. 270 (1978).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol62/iss2/6
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
would take the interests of the public into consideration.
"Anticompetitive" canons which serve to protect the public
and not the professions would be more likely to be accepted.6
The ethical rules that were the subject of Justice Blackmun's
concern would probably fall into this category. Thus, competi-
tion within the professions would still be preserved, but not at
the expense of sacrificing the integrity of the professions.
I. CONCLUSION
Strict Sherman Act scrutiny for the professions represents
a marked shift from the presumed antitrust exemption of the
Federal Baseball era. While it is clear after Goldfarb and
National Society that no such blanket exemption exists, it is
unclear whether the Court will always apply traditional Sher-
man Act analysis to the professions. The Goldfarb opinion indi-
cated that restraints on professions might be treated differently
in some cases. However, the Court did not appear to observe
any distinction between the professions and other businesses in
National Society where the restraint on the professional was
illegal per se.
If there is to be any flexibility in the Court's application of
the Sherman Act to the professions it will probably be in its
treatment of professional restraints which are not illegal per se.
Especially in analyzing professional ethical canons which are
imposed to protect the public, the Court may be willing to
consider factors other than the impact on competition in some
cases. This approach would promote the high professional stan-
dards society deserves while preserving the competitive envi-
ronment the Sherman Act requires.
JAMES H. GORMLEY, JR.
CIVIL PROCEDURE-Right to Jury Trial-Congress In-
tended to Grant Right to Jury Trial in Actions Under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Lorillard v. Pons,
434 U.S. 575 (1978). In Lorillard v. Pons' the United States
66. Cf. Friedman v. Rogers, 47 U.S.L.W. 4151 (1979) (where the Supreme Court
upheld some state regulation of optometrists against a first amendment challenge on
the grounds that it was needed for the protection of the public).
1. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
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Supreme Court held that Congress had by implication granted
a right to a jury trial in private actions seeking lost wages for
alleged violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967.2 Since the Court based its holding on what it
perceived to be the congressional intent to provide a jury trial
under the ADEA, it avoided the need to determine whether the
seventh amendment would have required such a right in the
absence of such congressional intent. As importantly, the Court
concluded by distinguishing between similar provisions of the
ADEA and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 While a right to a jury
trial is now available in actions brought under the ADEA be-
cause of perceived congressional intent, the opposite congres-
sional intent serves as the basis of denying a' right to a jury trial
in Title VII actions. Of course, only the denial of the right to a
jury trial on the basis of perceived legislative intent raises con-
stitutional issues.
I. BASIS OF DECISION: AvOIDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
Frances P. Pons, alleged that she had been discharged by
2. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976))
[hereinafter referred to as ADEA]. Sections 626(b) and (c) of the ADEA read in
pertinent part as follows:
(b) The provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in accordance with the
powers, remedies, and procedures provided in sections 211(b), 216 (except for
subsection (a) thereof), and 217 of this title, and subsection (c) of this sec-
tion. . . . Amounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of this chapter
shall be deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation
for purposes of sections 216 and 217 of this title: Provided, That liquidated
damages shall be payable only in cases of willful violations of this chapter. In
any action brought to enforce this chapter the court shall have jurisdiction to
grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the
purposes of this chapter, including without limitation judgments compelling
employment, reinstatement or promotion, or enforcing the liability for amounts
deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation under
this section. Before instituting any action under this section, the Secretary shall
attempt to eliminate the discriminatory practice or practices alleged, and to
effect voluntary compliance with the requirements of this chapter through infor-
mal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion.
(c) Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action in any court of competent
jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of
this chapter: Provided, That the right of any person to bring such action shall
terminate upon the commencement of an action by the Secretary to enforce the
right of such employee under this chapter.
The ADEA was amended on April 6, 1978, see note 26 infra, but all references to
the ADEA will be to the unamended Act unless otherwise noted.
3. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e to 2000e-17 (1976)).
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Lorillard in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 and sought injunctive relief including: reinstate-
ment, lost wages, liquidated and punitive damages, costs and
attorney's fees.4 Lorillard, her employer, moved the district
court to strike Ms. Pons' demand for trial by jury on the issue
of lost wages and the motion was granted. 5 The district court
certified the issue for interlocutory appeal6 to the Fourth Cir-
cuit which allowed the appeal and vacated the district court's
order, ruling that the ADEA and the seventh amendment af-
forded respondent the right to a jury trial on the issue. The
Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's decision.7
A. Avoiding the Seventh Amendment Test
Under the Constitution, Congress clearly has the power to
devise new remedies, both legal and equitable, and to create
new rights.8 The Congress also has the power to define the
method of enforcing these new rights,9 and in civil actions the
power is limited only by the seventh amendment. The amend-
ment provides that, "In Suits at common law. . . the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved. . . ."10 This limitation assures
the right to a jury trial in common law or "legal" actions" and
prevents Congress from creating a right of action without a
concomitant right to a jury trial if the issue to be tried involves
rights and remedies of the sort typically enforced in an action
at law. 12 On the other hand, if the remedy made available by
Congress is of an equitable nature, no such jury trial right
exists. 13 Neither is the Congress precluded from "extending the
4. Pons v. Lorillard, 549 F.2d 950, 951 (4th Cir. 1977).
5. Pons v. Lorillard, 69 F.R.D. 576 (M.D.N.C. 1976).
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976).
7. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
8. 5 MOORE's FEDERAL PRAMCwCE 38.11[7], at 128 (1978).
9. Id. at 116.
10. U.S. CoNsw. amend. VII.
11. The Court made it clear very early that the right under the seventh amendment
extended beyond the common law forms of action recognized in 1791 when the amend-
ment was adopted and applied to subsequent statutory enactments of Congress. Par-
sons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830). This extension was explicitly
reaffirmed in Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974).
12. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 460-61
(1977); Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 375 (1974); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S.
189, 195 (1974); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970).
13. In Ross v. Bernhard, the Court provided a guide for determining the "legal"
nature of an issue. The Court must consider: "[Flirst, the pre-merger custom with
reference to such questions; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the practical abili-
ties and limitations of juries." 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
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right of jury trial to non-common law actions, such as suits in
equity and in admiralty."' 4
If a statute expressly provides for the right to a jury trial,
the classification of the action as legal or equitable is immater-
ial.'" Problems arise, however, when a statute enacted by Con-
gress is silent on the right to a jury trial. The court must then
examine the nature of the action in order to determine whether
a jury trial right is demanded either by the statute itself, or
under the constitutional test as it has evolved in the Court's
decisions from Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover" to Atlas
Roofing Co. v. Occupational Health & Safety Review
Commission.'7
Unfortunately, the lower courts have been unable to syn-
thesize an accurate and easily applicable test from this long
line of cases, with the result that decisions to grant or deny a
jury trial under a statute not expressly authorizing one are not
uniform. For example, prior to Lorillard the circuit courts were
split on the ADEA jury question and the rationales for either
allowing or denying this right were inconsistent. Additionally,
the jury question for a given statute has often been decided by
a mechanical application of a chosen version of the constitu-
tional test,'9 or the issue has been perfunctorily disposed of with
scant analysis. 20 Thus in Lorillard although it may have recog-
nized that a new and clearer synthesis of its holdings from
Beacon Theatres to Atlas Roofing was required, the Court was
not ready to formulate such a synthesis. Instead, it inferred a
congressional intent to provide for a jury trial on the basis of
the legislative history and structure of the ADEA.
B. The ADEA
Enacted to eliminate age discrimination from the work-
14. 5 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.08[5], at 82 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
15. Id. T 38.12[1], at 128.24.
16. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
17. 430 U.S. 442 (1977). See also Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974);
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Katchen
v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
18. Compare Morelock v. NCR Corp., 546 F.2d 682 (6th Cir. 1976), vacated and
remanded, 435 U.S. 911 (1978) (no jury right) with Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r
Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978) (jury right).
19. See, e.g., Pons v. Lorillard, 549 F.2d 950, 953-54 (4th Cir. 1977), affl'd, 434 U.S.
575 (1978).
20. See, e.g., Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1094 (5th Cir. 1975); Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969).
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place, the ADEA is a type of "piggy-back" legislation which
creates a new statutory right that is procedurally enforced
trough a pre-existing statute, in this instance, the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938.1 The ADEA specifies that its provisions
"shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies,
and procedures" 22 set out, in part, in sections 216(b) and 217
of the FLSA.3
In general, the FLSA compels employer compliance with set
wage and hour limits by utilizing both legal and equitable rem-
edies. Section 216(b) of the Act allows an aggrieved employee
to bring a private action against his employer for unpaid mini-
mum wages or overtime compensation and liquidated damages
in any state or federal court of competent jurisdiction. Section
217 allows the Secretary of Labor of his own initiative to bring
suit in the district courts to enjoin an employer's violation of
the FLSA and to restrain "any withholding of payment of mini-
mum wages or overtime compensation" found by the court to
be owed to employees under the Act.24
Congress departed somewhat from the provisions of the
FLSA enforcement mechanism when it passed the ADEA. For
instance, whereas in a private action under section 216(b) of
the FLSA an employee may recover lost wages, overtime com-
pensation and liquidated damages; in a private action under
section 626(c) of the ADEA, he may seek "such legal or equita-
ble relief as will effectuate the purposes" of the ADEA. Com-
parably under the ADEA the Secretary is granted the full range
of remedies available to employees in private actions, and, fur-
ther, may seek an injunction in the district or state courts. 26
Also, while liquidated damages generally flow as a matter of
right to private plaintiffs for violations under the FLSA,27 Con-
gress specified in the ADEA that they may be awarded only for
"willful violations" of the Act.2 Finally, the ADEA includes
21. Ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976) [hereinafter
referred to as FLSA].
22. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
23. 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (Supp. 1978); 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1976).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1976).
25. Id. § 626(c). See also id. § 626(b). This includes an injunction which under the
FLSA is available only to the Secretary. See, e.g., Powell v. Washington Post Co., 267
F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 930 (1959).
26. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
27. But see 434 U.S. at 581 n.8.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
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provisions for informal, voluntary settlement procedures not
found in the FLSA.29
Under the ADEA a person allegedly discriminated against
on the basis of age in an employment situation may bring an
action for appropriate legal or equitable relief in any state or
federal court of competent jurisdiction. 30 Any amounts owing
the plaintiff as a result of the discrimination are deemed to be
"unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation" 31
for the purposes of sections 216 and 217 of the FLSA. Thus,
when an aggrieved employee brings a private action under sec-
tion 626(c) of the ADEA for amounts owing as a result of the
employer's unlawful conduct, the suit is litigated under the
"powers, remedies, and procedures" 32 of section 216(c) of the
FLSA, subject only to the additional provisions allowed by the
ADEA for suits under that section of the FLSA.
In neither the FLSA nor the ADEA did Congress make ex-
press provision for the right to a jury trial. The lower courts,
however, have unanimously held that there is a right to a jury
trial in private actions under section 216(b) of the FLSA for
unpaid statutory compensation and liquidated damages. 3
Thus, the Supreme Court in Lorillard was able to hold that
when Congress directed that the ADEA be enforced in accord-
ance with the "powers, remedies, and procedures" of the
FLSA, one of the procedures incorporated into the ADEA was
the right to a jury trial on the issue of lost wages in private
actions.3 4 The Court reasoned that Congress was presumed to
be aware of the judicial granting of the right to a jury trial
under section 216(b) of the FLSA. Thus, when it directed that
the ADEA be enforced in accordance with the "procedures" of
the FLSA, it ratifieds the lower courts' interpretation of the
29. Id. § 626(b) & (d).
30. Id.
31. Id. § 626(b).
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Wirtz v. Jones, 340 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir. 1965); Lewis v. Times
Publishing Co., 185 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1950); Olearchick v. American Steel Foundries,
73 F. Supp. 273, 279 (W.D. Pa. 1947).
34. 434 U.S. at 582-83.
35. The word "ratify" and the term "congressional ratification" and their gram-
matical variants are adopted from the Court's discussion in Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975). There the Court stated that a consistent interpre-
tation by the courts of appeals of a particular provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
had been "plainly ratifiea" by Congress when it enacted the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Act of 1972 after rejecting amendments to change the particular section
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jury trial right under section 216(b), and incorporated that
right into subsections 626(b) and (c) of the ADEA.36
11. RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The Court took the established rule of statutory construc-
tion that "Congress is presumed to be aware of an administra-
tive or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that
interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change,
'37
and expanded it to include situations where "Congress adopts
a new law incorporating sections of a prior law, [in which case]
Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of
the interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least inso-
far as it affects the new statute."' ' This section of this note will
explore two questions raised by this language in Lorillard.
First, are the two rules above full and complete statements of
the current law on congressional incorporation of judicial hold-
ings or are there additional elements not discussed by the
Court which need to be considered in such situations? Second,
if prior law required consideration of other elements, did the
Court intend to abolish these elements, or, is the Lorillard rule
merely a succinct restatement of previous law?
A. Re-enacted Statutes: The Ratification Doctrine
While there are some cases to the contrary, 39 administrative
and judicial interpretations of a statute are usually deemed to
have received congressional approval if the statute is substan-
tially re-enacted. Thus, these decisions are given the effect of
law,'0 or at least a presumption of legislative approval of the
rulings is created. 4'
However, this rule on re-enactment had been a limited one.
An administrative agency or court could interpret a statute
construed by the courts of appeals. Cf. Thompson v. Clifford, 408 F.2d 154, 164 (D.C.
Cir. 1968) ("legislative ratification"). The term is used herein to signify congressional
approval of the construction of a statute by lower courts and administrative agencies
as evidenced by Congress' re-enactment of the particular section unchanged in subse-
quent legislation.
36. 434 U.S. at 580-81.
37. Id. at 580.
38. Id. at 581.
39. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (re-
enactment is an "unreliable indicium at best" of congressional satisfaction with a
statutory interpretation).
40. Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678, 682 (1965).
41. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
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only when the language of the statute was not plain, and ad-
mitted of more than one reasonable meaning," or when the
sense of the law was "doubtful and ambiguous."43 Thus subse-
quent re-enactment of a statute without change would not con-
stitute a ratification where the law was plain.
Additionally, where there was room for an administrative or
judicial interpretation, a court could not presume that Con-
gress adopted the interpretation unless such construction was
consistent with the legislative purpose behind the statute" and
unless the construction had a "'reasonable basis in law.' "4
Where there were compelling indications that an interpretation
was wrong or unreasonable, or that it ran counter to the pur-
pose of the statute, there was held to be no congressional adop-
tion of that construction unless Congress gave "express consid-
eration or reference" .to it."
Moreover, for a reasonable interpretation of a doubtful and
ambiguous statute to have been accorded any respect or
weight, the construction must have been "definitely settled."
It was usually stated that ratification required that the line of
construction be "consistent," 48 "long-standing," 49 "generally
unchallenged,"' 0 or "uniform."51
Also, Congress would not be "presumed to be aware of an
administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute, 5 2 in
every instance. As stated by Judge Learned Hand, the ration-
ale for the incorporation doctrine is that "those in charge of the
amendment are familiar with existing rulings, or that they
42. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). But see Harrison v.
Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 479 (1943).
43. Edwards v. Darby, 25 U.S. 126, 129, 12 Wheat. 206, 210 (1827). See also United
States v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 315 (1953); Louisville & Nashville R.R.
v. United States, 282 U.S. 740, 757 (1931); Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 251
(1926).
44. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 237 (1974).
45. Volkswagenwerk v. FMC, 390 U.S. 261, 272 (1968) (quoting NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944)).
46. Kristensen v. McGrath, 179 F.2d 796, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd, 340 U.S. 162
(1950). See also American Mail Line, Ltd. v. United States, 213 F. Supp. 152, 164
(W.D. Wash. 1962); Hanson v. Landy, 24 F. Supp. 535, 540 (D. Minn. 1938). Cf.
Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co.,.414 U.S. 86, 95-96 (1973) (no need for judicial deference
when "compelling indication" that administrative construction is wrong).
47. United States v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 278 U.S. 269, 280 (1929).
48. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972).
49. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974).
50. Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933).
51. United States v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 278 U.S. 269, 280 (1929).
52. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978).
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mean to incorporate them, whatever they may be."53 In most
cases a certain quantum of actual knowledge by those active
in securing passage of the legislation was required before the
doctrine would be invoked. To have called upon the ratification
doctrine, a line of rulings of an agency or of the courts must
have actually been called to the attention of Congress during
the consideration of the legislation, 4 and congressional aware-
ness must have been something more than "a few isolated
statements in the thousands of pages of legislative docu-
ments." 55 The doctrine was most likely to be utilized when
Congress had considered the provisions of earlier legislation "in
great detail" and where it would have been fair to assume that
it thus accepted the construction placed on the statute by the
administrative agency or the courts. 6 But congressional knowl-
edge and approval of rulings which it had never seen or consid-
ered were rarely imputed.
In view of the many cases in which the Court had employed
these rules of statutory construction, it seems best to consider
the Court's statement of the rule in Lorillard as merely a con-
cise shorthand version and not one which dismisses these quali-
fications. The same holds true whether the re-enactment doc-
trine or the Lorillard incorporation doctrine is applied. The
unqualified posture of the statement that Congress is presumed
to have knowledge of the construction given an existing statute
when it incorporates it into a new law is belied by the facts of
the case, which argue for a reading in line with the qualifica-
tions established in the rule for re-enacted legislation.
In the first instance, the section of the FLSA incorporated
into the ADEA and interpreted by the courts did not expressly
provide for a jury trial right and was therefore ambiguous on
this question. 57 Thus, a judicial construction of the statute was
proper.
Secondly, the line of decisions construing the jury trial right
under section 216(b) of the FLSA was "well established" since
53. Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 154 F.2d 785, 790 (2d Cir. 1946),
affl'd, 328 U.S. 275 (1946). See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 21 (1946)
(Rutledge, J., concurring).
54. See, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 192 (1978); United States v. Calamaro,
354 U.S. 351, 358-59 (1957); Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431
(1955); Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 292 U.S. 455, 468 (1934).
55. SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 121 (1978).
56. NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 365-66 (1951).
57. 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (Supp. 1978). See cases cited note 22 supra.
[Vol. 62:270
CIVIL PROCEDURE
"every" court to pass on the matter had found an implied right
to a jury trial.58 This comports with the general requirement
that the construction of the statute be "definitely settled.""9
Thirdly, the Court stressed the "detailed knowledge""0
which the Congress exhibited of the FLSA provisions and their
judicial interpretations. The Court noted that congressional
"selectivity. . .in incorporating provisions and in modifying
certain FLSA practices strongly suggests that but for those
changes Congress expressly made, it intended to incorporate
fully the remedies and procedures of the FLSA." 6' As discussed
above, the appication of the rule for re-enacted legislation gen-
erally requires a certain degree of actual knowledge on the part
of Congress. Here, the Court found considerable congressional
awareness of the previous judicial construction of the FLSA. It
seems, then, that just as the Court's recital of the established
rule of statutory construction for legislation subsequently re-
enacted should be read against the background of the Court's
prior decisions, so should the modification of the rule in
Lorillard be read to encompass similar qualifications.
B. Unanswered Questions
The Court's rationale in deciding Lorillard, however, does
raise some interesting questions. (1) What would happen to the
right to a jury trial under the ADEA if the FLSA were amended
to deny such a right under section 216(b)? 2 (2) Does congres-
sional ratification of the lower courts' decisions granting a jury
right under section 216(b) foreclose a contrary Supreme Court
determination? If not, what does "congressional ratification"
58. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978).
59. United States v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 278 U.S. 269, 280 (1929).
60. 434 U.S. at 581.
61. Id. at 582.
62. On April 6, 1978, after Lorillard was decided, the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189, were signed into
law. Section 4(a) of the Amendments renumbered § 626(c) of the ADEA to § 626(c)(1),
and created § 626(c)(2) of the ADEA to read:
In an action brought under paragraph (1), a person shall be entitled to a trial
by jury of any issue of fact in any such action for recovery of amounts owing as
a result of a violation of this chapter, regardless of whether equitable relief is
sought by any party in such action.
29 U.S.C.A. § 626(c)(2) (Supp. 1 June 1978). See 123 CONG. REc. S17,296 (daily ed.
Oct. 19, 1977) (remarks and amendment of Sen. Kennedy); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-
950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 976,
1007. Thus, although thig question was made moot insofar as it concerns the ADEA,
it, nonetheless, is interesting for its precedential ramifications.
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mean? (3) Should the Supreme Court accept as binding lower
court decisions which Congress has ratified in enacting a new
law even though the Court has never decided on the merits of
the lower court rulings? 3 (4) Must congressional "knowledge"
of the provisions of an existing statute and its judicial interpre-
tation always reach the degree of detail which Congress exhib-
ited when it enacted the ADEA?
Although the answers to these questions are important, the
Court's decision should not, in all probability, be pushed to
such rigorous limits. Lorillard should perhaps be viewed as a
pragmatic attempt by the Court to decide an important ques-
tion on the right to a jury trial under an increasingly important
statute while at the same time avoiding, to the greatest extent
possible, embarking on any discussion of the state of the law
as it relates to the right to a jury trial under the seventh amend-
ment. A more important question posed by Lorillard is: When
should the courts invoke the seventh amendment test, as op-
posed to the statutory test, in determining the jury trial right.
In Curtis v. Loether,64 the Court considered the jury ques-
tion as it relates to the Fair Housing Act of 1968.5 In contrast
to Lorillard, the Court, while noting that the statute provided
plausible arguments both for and against a jury right, summa-
rily dismissed a* statutory approach and stated that "the ne-
cessity for jury trial is so clearly settled by our prior Seventh
Amendment decisions that it would be futile to spend time on
the statutory issue ... ."I' In Lorillard, however, the Court
followed the "'cardinal principle that this Court will first as-
certain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible
by which the [constitutional] question may be avoided.' "67
The Court found that it "need not address the constitutional
issue," since the statutory one was dispositive66 These state-
ments may be viewed as marking a trend away from the sev-
enth amendment test, unless the statutory examination is not
63. See Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1946) (Court overruling its
own construction of a statute which had been considered by Congress on several pre-
vious occasions where the part construed had been re-enacted).
64. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
65. Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801-901, 82 Stat. 73, 81-90 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
3601-3631 (1970)).
66. 415 U.S. at 192 n.6 (emphasis added).
67. United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971) (quoting
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
68. 434 U.S. at 577.
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fruitful. But this trend is less than clear, and until the Court
squarely addresses the issue, Lorillard can serve only to perpet-
uate the confusion prevalent among the lower courts.
III. COURT CONTINUES TO DISTINGUISH TITLE VII JURY RIGHT
Of more far reaching importance than its holding on the
primary question was the Court's continued attempt to distin-
guish Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19649 from the ADEA
and other similar statutes. 0 The lower courts, in almost uni-
formly holding that Title VII denies the right to a jury trial on
the issue of back pay,7" have responded to an apparent congres-
sional characterization of the back pay remedy as an "integral
part of the statutory equitable remedy"72 and therefore exempt
from the seventh amendment's requirements. One of the bases
the Court in Lorillard used in distinguishing Title VII was that
of congressional intent.73 The Court also noted that "even if
petitioner is correct that Congress did not intend there to be
jury trials under Title VII, that fact sheds no light on congres-
sional intent under the ADEA."' Thus, the Court, although
expressly disclaiming any decision on the jury trial issue under
Title V2II, 7 seems, nonetheless, to have strengthiened by recog-
nition the congressional characterization argument employed
by the lower courts in Title VII controversies.76 This section
69. See note 3 supra.
70. E.g., the Fair Housing Act of 1968, see note 65 supra, which the Court held in
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), provided for a jury trial by right, if requested,
under the seventh amendment. In Lorillard, the Court stated that while the "aims"
and "substantive prohibitions" of the ADEA and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were very
similar, the "remedial and procedural provisions of the two laws. . . [were] crucial"
and it found "significant differences" between them. 434 U.S. at 584.
71. See, e.g., Harmon v. May Broadcasting Co., 583 F.2d 410 (8th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam); Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975); EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co.,
515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 431 U.S. 951
(1977); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed, 404
U.S. 1006 (1971); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir.
1969).
72. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969)
(emphasis added). Cf. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1974) (apparently
approving the lower court view).
73. 434 U.S. at 585 n.14..
74. Id. at 585.
75. Id. at 583-84.
76. Even before Lorillard, courts and commentators responded to the Court's Title
VII remarks. See, e.g., Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 1975); Comment,
The Right to Jury Trial Under the Age Discrimination in Employment and Fair Labor
Standards Acts, 44 U. Cm. L. Rav. 365, 372 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Right to Jury
Trial Under ADEA and FLSA].
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will: (1) examine the validity of judicial reliance on congres-
sional characterization of a remedy as equitable and (2) suggest
an alternative analysis for use in Title VII cases.
A. Congressional Characterization
Since Congress may not deny the right to a jury where such
right is guaranteed by the seventh amendment, congressional
attempts to characterize a remedy as equitable are similarly
restricted. This is necessarily so, since an unabridged power to
characterize a remedy would allow Congress to limit use of jury
trials and thus to unilaterally amend the Constitution by
means of statutory enactments.77
In 1891, in two cases dealing with state legislative charac-
terizations of statutory remedies, the Court suggested that the
seventh amendment question be determined by looking not to
the legislative characterization, but to the underlying nature of
the action.18 Since that date, the Court has carved out only a
rather narrow area in which congressional characterization of
a remedy as equitable will be permitted to supersede the sev-
enth amendment jury guarantee.
In 1966, in Katchen v. Landy,75 the Court analyzed a stat-
ute" which did not characterize an action as either legal or
equitable and found an implied congressional intent to provide
quick, summary and binding determination in equity of a
bankrupt's creditors.8' The Court held that a jury trial would
"dismember" 82 the statutory scheme of the Bankruptcy Act.
Eleven years later, 83 explaining its holding in Katchen, the
Court stated that the grounds for allowing a court to exercise
its summary jurisdiction without a jury in such a situation were
that a bankruptcy court "was a specialized court of equity84
77. United States v. Jepson, 90 F. Supp. 983, 986 (D.N.J. 1950). Cf. Whitehead v.
Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146, 151 (1891).
78. Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106 (1891) (contract debt); Whitehead v. Shattuck,
138 U.S. 146 (1891) (action to recover realty).
79. 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
80. 11 U.S.C. § 11-1103 (1964). Title 11 was extensively revised by the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. As to the current jurisdiction
of bankruptcy courts and the availability of a jury trial, see id. § 241, 92 Stat. at 2668
(codified at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1471-1482 (Supp. 1978)).
81. 382 U.S. at 328-30, 336-38.
82. Id. at 339.
83. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
84. In Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974), the Court implied that a
"specialized court of equity" was one traditionally viewed as exercising equitable




and constituted a forum before which a jury would be out of
place and would go far to dismantle the statutory scheme"
provided by Congress.8 5 In discussing Katchen the Court has
also stated that where there is a "functional justification for
denying the jury trial right,"8 congressional characterization,
even though implied, can hold a cause of action free from the
requirements of the seventh amendment.8 7
In applying the reasoning of Katchen to a Title VII action
for back pay, it is difficult to see how a jury would "go far to
dismantle" or "dismember" the relief provided by the Act,
except perhaps that jury prejudice could foreseeably under-
mine its purpose.,8 Additionally, the court sitting for a Title VII
action is not a "specialized" court of equity as is a bankruptcy
court, but instead is an Article HI court89 of general jurisdiction
in which a jury trial is consistent with adjudication of legal
issues.'"
In 1977, in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety
Commission9' the Court upheld the power of Congress to en-
trust the enforcement of "new statutory 'public rights' 2 . . .to
an administrative agency with which a jury trial would be in-
compatible, without violating the Seventh Amendment's in-
junction"9 3 on preserving jury trials. The Court, without listing
criteria, distinguished new statutory public rights from
"[w]holly private tort, contract, and property cases, as well as
a vast range of other cases." 4 Thus, it appears that in certain
specific instances Congress can provide for the initial resolu-
tion of rights in statutory administrative forums which are free
from the strictures of the seventh amendment. However, the
Court re-emphasized that the seventh amendment "prevents
Congress from depriving a litigant of a jury trial in a 'legal'
action before a tribnal customarily utilizing a jury as its fact-
85. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 454 n.11
(1977) (emphasis added) (footnote added).
86. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974).
87. Id.
88. However, the Court rejected this argument in Curtis. Id. at 198.
89. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2.
90. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 458-59
(1977).
91. Id.
92. "[E.]g., where the Government is involved in its sovereign capacity under an
otherwise valid statute creating enforceable public rights." Id. at 458.
93. Id. at 455 (footnote added).
94. Id. at 458.
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finding arm. . . and this Court has the final decision on the
question whether a jury is required."95
As juries are customary before Article I district courts98
when they are resolving disputes of a "legal" nature and the
right to recover lost wages for illegal job discrimination is not
a "new statutory public right, 9 7 Atlas offers little if any sup-
port for a finding that the issue of back pay under Title VII is
free from the strictures of the seventh amendment. Since it
seems that the issue of back pay under Title VII does not fall
within the exceptions established by the Court in Katchen and
Atlas, the question cannot be answered by resorting to a con-
gressional characterization of the remedy but must be an-
swered by a seventh amendment test of the nature of the issue
itself.98
95. Id. at 461 n.16 (emphasis added).
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1-2.
97. See, e.g., Emmens v. Elderton, 10 Eng. Rep. 606 (H.L. 1853).
98. It has been suggested that if labeling of the Title VII back pay remedy as
equitable cannot successfully be based on legislative characterization of it as a restitu-
tionary equitable remedy, it can be based on the fact that the court in Title VII back
pay actions is allowed some discretion. Right to Jury Trial Under ADEA and FLSA,
supra note 76, at 373. The Court has found that a limited degree of discretion to award
back pay is available to district courts in Title VII actions. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S.
575, 584 (1978); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416, 421 (1975); Right
to Jury Trial Under ADEA and FLSA, supra note 76, at 371. Justice Rehnquist,
concurring in Albemarle, stated that the discretion criteria followed from Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), and commented that to the degree that the district courts
retain
substantial discretion as to whether or not to award backpay. . . the nature of
the jurisdiction which the court exercises is equitable, and under our cases
neither party may demand a jury trial. To the extent that discretion is replaced
by awards which follow as a matter of course from a finding of wrongdoing, the
action of the court in making such awards could not be fairly characterized as
equifable in character, and would quite arguably be subject to the provisions of
the Seventh Amendment.
Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 443. (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
However, while discretion and flexibility are certainly the hallmarks of equity, 1 J.
PoMERoY, A TREATISE ON EQurry JuRISPRUDENCE § 109 (5th ed. 1941), they are not the
guiding criteria for determining if a particular remedy is equitable in nature.
The question whether a particular case was to be tried in a court of equity -
without a jury - or a court of law - with a jury - did not depend on whether
the suit involved factfinding or on the nature of the facts to be found ...
Rather, as a general rule, the decision turned on whether courts of law supplied
a cause of action and an adequate remedy to the litigant.
Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 458-59 (1977) (foot-
note omitted). See also Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 539 (1970); Dairy Queen, Inc.
v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500,




B. Title VII Jury Right Under the Seventh Amendment
The issue of back pay recoverable under Title VII, although
labeled an equitable restitutionary remedy by numerous lower
courts, 9 appears, however, to be a statutory codification of the
common law action of general assumpsit for breach of contract
by wrongful discharge, 0 for which a jury was historically avail-
able. 10' Attempts to label back pay under Title VII as a restitu-
tionary remedy miss the mark. Restitution at equity was to
restore the plaintiff "to the possession of his specific debt, his
chattels, or real property."'' 0 "In equity, restitution is usually
thought of as a remedy by which defendant is made to disgorge
If viewed as an action in contract or, alternatively, in tort, as argued, the back pay
remedy is at law and subject to the jury trial provisions of the seventh amendment.
The sufficiency and adequacy of the back pay provision of Title VII have not been
questioned, and the discretion which the Court has stated is allowed a court in such a
situation is not foreign to courts of law - as is evidenced by patent litigation, where
the court has discretion to treble damage awards returned by the jury. 35 U.S.C. § 284
(1976). See Comment, The Seventh Amendment and Civil Rights Statutes: History
Adrift in a Maelstrom, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 503, 523-24 (1973). Claims that the complex-
ity of some Title VII back pay actions requires equitable jurisdiction are weak in light
of the Court's holding in Dairy Queen, where it pointed to the powers given district
courts to appoint masters to assist the jury in cases of "exceptional" complexity. 369
U.S. at 478.
99. See, e.g., Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 296 F. Supp. 1232 (N.D. Ga.
1969), rev'd on other grounds, 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970). Cf. Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976) provides in part:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the com-
plaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees,
with or without back pay. . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate. . . . Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable dili-
gence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the
back pay otherwise allowable.
The last sentence quoted from this section virtually codifies the common law courts'
method for determining damages for wrongful discharge whereby the net amounts of
the employee's earnings at a subsequent job were deducted, or the amount he could
reasonably have earned in similar employment sought after the discharge in order to
mitigate his losses. 11 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1358, at
302 (3rd ed. W. Jaeger 1968). Cf. U.S. v. Jepson, 90 F. Supp. 983, 986 (D.N.J. 1950)
("[W]hen a federal statute embraces a common-law form of action, that action does
not lose its identity merely because it finds itself enmeshed in a statute. . . . To hold
otherwise would be to open the way for Congress to nullify the Constitutional right of
trial by jury by mere statutory enactments.").
101. See, e.g., Fuchs v. Koerner, 107 N.Y. 529, 14 N.E. 445 (1887); Sutherland v.
Wyer, 67 Me. 64 (1877); Baldwin v. Bennett, 4 Cal. 392 (1854). See also Ochoa v.
American Oil Co., 338 F. Supp. 914, 918-19 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
102. 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcTICE 38.24[2], at 190.5 (1978).
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ill-gotten gains or to restore the status quo, or to accomplish
both objectives."' 3 Liability under the restitution is based on
unjust enrichment."'4 When a plaintiff seeks back pay for
being wrongfully discharged under Title VII he does not seek
to have anything wrongfully obtained by the employer "re-
stored" to him.10 Instead he seeks to protect an expectancy
interest on which common law contract damages are based.'
Additionally, in the case of a violation of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 based on racial discrimination, 7 the Court has
suggested that such a violation may also create a cause of ac-
tion which sounds basically in tort. In Curtis v. Loether,1"" the
Court held that a violation of the Fair Housing Act of 19689
based on race could "also be likened to an action for defama-
tion or intentional infliction of mental distress. . . .[Ilt has
been suggested that 'under the logic of the common law devel-
opment of a law of insult and indignity, racial discrimination
might be treated as a dignitary tort.' "0 These types of tort
actons were enforced at common law and a jury right was avail-
able."'
The Court has emphatically stated that "legal claims are
not magically converted into equitable issues by their presenta-
tion to a court of equity,"'' 2 a pronouncement all but neglected
by the lower courts in Title VII actions. Furthermore, there
appears to be no justification for judicial obedience to any con-
gressional characterization of the back pay issue as an equita-
ble remedy since it does not fall within the Katchen or Atlas
boundaries within which an action may be free of the strictures
of the seventh amendment. The Supreme Court's continued
103. Id. (footnote omitted).
104. 1 G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTrruTION § 1.1, at 2 (1978).
105. 5 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcricE 38.24[2], at 190.5 (1978).
106. Comment, Jury Trial in Employment Discrimination Cases - Constitution-
ally Mandated?, 53 Tax. L. REV. 483, 499 (1975).
107. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a) (1976)).
108. 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974).
109. Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 812, 82 Stat. 73, 88 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1976)).
110. 415 U.S. at 195-96 n.10 (quoting C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATEI-
AIS ON ToRS 961 (2d ed. 1969)). See also Pons v. Lorillard, 549 F.2d 950, 954 (4th Cir.
1977), affl'd, 434 U.S. 575 (1978); Cleverly v. Western Elec. Co., 69 F.R.D. 348, 350-51
(W.D. Mo. 1975); Note, Tort Remedies for Employment Discrimination Under Title
V1, 54 VA. L. REV. 491 (1968); Comment, Enforcement of Fair Employment Under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 32 U. Cm. L. REv. 430, 467-68 (1965).
111. 5 MooRE'S FEDERAL PRACncE § 38.11[5], at 118-19 (1978).
112. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970).
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distinguishing of Title VII from other similar statutes serves
little purpose except to encourage a rote recital by the lower
courts of district and circuit court precedents."'
While the early cases in this area were, perhaps mistakenly,
based on an understandable and well-intentioned desire to ef-
fect good public policy,"' later courts considering the issue
have not keenly analyzed the seventh amendment decisions of
the Supreme Court. Thorough and insightful discussion of the
issue in Title VII back pay cases has waned to the point where
one circuit court recently was able to proclaim:
We join the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits in
holing that jury trials needs not be provided defendants in
Title VII suits. . . An award of back pay under Title VII
• . . is an integral part of the equitable remedy of reinstate-
ment and is not comparable to damages in a common-law
action for breach of employment contract.15
But precedent can embalm even a faulty principle, and until
the Court passes squarely on the jury question, it appears there
will be little to move the lower courts to a renewed and probing
examination in this area.116
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Lorillard avoided any modification
or redefinition of its previous seventh amendment holdings on
the right to a jury trial under a statute silent on the question.
113. E.g., Harmon v. May Broadcasting Co., 583 F.2d 410 (8th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam).
114. One commentator suggests that federal judges handling the early Title VII
discrimination cases were influenced by practical considerations to rule that there was
no jury right under the statute. Of the early cases in which a jury was requested, the
comment suggests three facts are common:
(1) [The request was made by the defendant; (2) the suit was brought in the
South; (3) the plaintiff alleged that the discrimination was racially motivated.
These facts suggest that some southern defendants hope[d] to utilize sym-
pathetic juries to avoid the imposition of the sanctions provided in Title VII for
racial discrimination - the underlying assumption being that white jurors, who
may themselves be competing with blacks for jobs, will be less sympathetic than
a federal judge to the discrimination claims of the black workers.
Comment, The Right to Jury Trial Under Title WI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 37
U. Cm. L. REv. 167, 167 (1969-1970) (footnotes omitted).
115. Harmon v. May Broadcasting Co., 583 F.2d 410, 410-11 (8th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam).
116. See, e.g., Baker v. City of Detroit, 458 F. Supp. 379, 382 (E.D. Mich. 1978)
(court stated it was "unwilling to disregard ... [the] clear and well-reasoned man-
date" against Title VII jury trials because the circuit courts had "spoken with one
voice" on the question).
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Instead, it adopted a pragmatic, narrow, statutory approach
and decided the question of a jury trial right under the ADEA
on what it perceived to be an implied congressional grant of
such a right as evidenced by the structure of the Act. But
whether the decision marks a trend away from the seventh
amendment test is not at all certain. Perhaps the only general
statement that can be made about Lorillard is that it teaches
the jury questions be determined on a case by case basis.
The Court continued in Lorillard to distinguish Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 from other similar statutes which
the Court has decided provide for a jury right. Such a distinc-
tion serves only to perpetuate what appears to be the use of
faulty logic by the lower court on the Title VII jury question.
What is needed from the Court, and what Lorillard failed
to provide, is a broad, yet clear synthesis of its holdings from
Beacon to Atlas, which will guide the lower courts in deciding
whether a jury trial right exists under a statute which is silent
on the matter. Such a synthesis would go a long way toward
ensuring a uniform grant or denial of the right to a jury by the
lower courts in various statutory causes of action. It would
also establish a criterion for the courts to apply in deciding
whether a right to a jury trial exists when a court has implied
a remedy" 7 or a cause of action"' where none has been ex-
pressly authorized either under the Constitution or a statute.
While a new synthesis by the Court is needed, it should in
no instance be found on the ability of Congress to denominate
a statutory cause of action as equitable when in fact that cause
of action is of a legal nature under a seventh amendment test.
If the seventh amendment is to preserve anything, such a
117. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Court
recognized a tort remedy for persons whose rights were violated in searches and seizures
carried out in violation of the fourth amendment.
118. In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), the Court delineated the factors to
consider to determine whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly
providing one. Last term, the Court agreed to decide whether a private right of action
exists under 20 U.S.C. 1682 (1976), which prohibits sex discrimination in most feder-
ally assisted educational institutions, for a female plaintiff allegedly discriminated
against on the basis of her sex when she unsuccessfully sought admission to federally
assisted private medical schools. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063
(7th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 3142 (1978). Should the Court imply a private
action right under the statute, it would then be necessary to decide whether the right
to a jury trial also exists.
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power cannot constitutionally be delegated to the Congress
beyond the mark established in Katchen and Atlas. '19
Ross F. PLAETZER
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Double Jeopardy-Double
Jeopardy Clause Not Offended by Appeal of Dismissal on
Defendant's Motion if Dismissal Requires No Determina-
tion of Guilt. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
Until 1970 the government's right to appeal a criminal case was
limited by a number of jurisdictional provisions which greatly
reduced the need to decide issues regarding the government's
right to appeal on constitutional grounds.' However, the Omni-
bus Crime Control Act of 19702 eliminated these jurisdictional
restrictions and allowed government appeals of decisions, judg-
ments and orders except "where the double jeopardy clause of
the United States Constitution3 prohibits further prosecu-
tion."4 Since 1971 there has been a resurgence of interest in the
double jeopardy protection as a result of this change, and a
number of Supreme Court cases have focused specifically upon
its scope.5
These and earlier cases interpreting the clause have gener-
ally held that acquittals are not appealable by the government
while, absent prosecutorial misconduct or judicial overreach-
ing, mistrials generally are appealable.6 Problems in interpret-
ing the scope of the clause arise, however, in instances of dis-
missals which can be characterized neither as mistrials nor as
acquittals. The general rule which had been followed in such
119. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S. Ct. 645, 655 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (forcefully stating the "preservation" aspect of the seventh amendment).
1. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339 (1975).
2. Pub. L. No. 91-644, 84 Stat. 1880 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976)).
3. U.S. CONsT. amend. V reads in part: "nor shall any person be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
4. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976) (footnote added).
5. See, e.g., Swisher v. Brady, 98 S. Ct. 2699 (1978); United States v. Scott, 437
U.S. 82 (1978); Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978); Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S.
28 (1978); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1
(1978); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S.
497 (1978); United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14 (1976); Serfass v. United States, 420
U.S. 377 (1975); United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975); United States v.
Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
6. See text accompanying notes 27-55 infra.
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